INTRODUCTION
In the promised land of milk and honey, the most basic of human elixirs is still the most precious. Myriad disagreements paralyze the IsraeliPalestinian peace process in 2011, but the water crisis may be the most intractable.
Israeli NGOs estimate an average West Bank Palestinian's water consumption to be about 37 liters per day, and an average Israeli's to be about 211 liters.
1 By comparison, "First World" countries like the U.S. and Canada
The water shortage is largely due to geography and climate. There are two major water sources in the region: the surface waters of the Jordan River Basin-shared by Israel with the surrounding Arab countries-and the groundwater of the mountain aquifers extending beneath the West Bank and across the Green Line into Israel. Climate change and over-exploitation of the surface waters have greatly depleted the mighty Jordan of biblical times. "When I was a boy," Mark Twain wrote upon first glimpsing the river, "I somehow got the impression that [it] was four thousand miles long and thirtyfive miles wide. It is not any wider than Broadway in New York."
4 Today, the Jordan alternates in size between rivulet and creek.
Still, Israel extracts fresh water from Lake Tiberias (the biblical "Sea of Galilee") and it has already diminished the Jordan tributary for much of its realistically much lower because of the large proportion of consumption devoted to agricultural irrigation).
2 Elver, supra note 1, at 426. J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 201
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Spring 2013 domestic use, leaving the downstream Palestinian population with what has been described as a "drainage ditch." 5 The mountain aquifer's underground chambers-divided between the Western, Northeastern, and Eastern subbasins-are therefore critical; they are also, however, the subject of contention between the Israelis and Palestinians because the basins cross political lines, complicating issues of ownership and control.
While about eighty percent of the aquifer resides below West Bank soil, collecting mostly from rainfall in the West Bank, eighty percent of the potable water flows into Israeli territory and is stored there;
6 it is indisputable that most of the aquifer water originates in the Palestinian territories, but comes to rest in Israel. Mekorot, the private Israeli company that has enjoyed a monopoly on water utility management since 1982, then pumps the collected water throughout the country and into the territories at fixed prices (before distribution costs). Estimates vary, but on balance, it appears that Israelis consume roughly ten times as much water as the Palestinians do from these sub-basins. 7 It is perhaps unsurprising how little attention the world devotes to the Israeli-Palestinian water conflict compared to suicide bombings and refugees. The battle lines here do not appear on CNN; they are literally subterranean, hidden from view beneath the arid soil. The 1990s peace process brought water allocation to the forefront of negotiations for the first time, and Article 40, Annex III of the 1995 Oslo II Interim Agreement provided a framework for cooperation. Israel turned over water distribution responsibilities in the West Bank to the Palestinian Authority, while effectively retaining control over well license permits. It also set concrete benchmarks for short-term Since 1995, the peace process has repeatedly collapsed, and Final Status talks appear unlikely in the near future. Both parties have resorted to inflammatory allegations that the other is violating the Interim Agreement: the Palestinian Authority (P.A.) claims Israel is violating international law by denying the Palestinians their sovereign water rights and engaging in discriminatory pricing, while Israel claims the P.A. is negligently mismanaging water and stubbornly refusing to optimize alternative water resources. 9 The two parties stare across the diplomatic impasse, and all the while, the Sea of Galilee is at its lowest level in recorded history, annual rainfall continues to drop, and the Palestinian population is skyrocketing. 10 This article argues that the legal debate over "water rights" of the West Bank aquifer is counter-productive; the seemingly relevant international law is largely inapposite, and the 1995 Interim Agreement, intended as a temporary framework rather than a lasting resolution, creates disputes rather than resolving them. Instead of wrangling over problematic legal frameworks, the Palestinian Authority should recruit private sector investment of foreign and domestic capital to develop alternative West Bank water sources, such as desalination and wastewater treatment, and they should modernize their inefficient water delivery infrastructure. Focusing on privatization J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 203
Spring 2013 techniques 11 to increase the quantity and quality of usable water would offer the following advantages: (1) it would dramatically increase Palestinians' access to potable water; (2) reduce West Bank Palestinians' dependence on Mekorot and Israeli pricing; (3) remove the water conflict from the diplomatic arena's clogged channels and diffuse tensions in the peace process; and (4) perhaps most importantly, deprive Israel of its primary political argument against the Palestinian water rights claims-that the P.A. ignores its governing responsibilities by wastefully mismanaging its resources, refusing to explore alternative water supply techniques, and holding progress hostage to Final Status talks. Water privatization is a chance for the Palestinian Authority to disprove the famous quote by Israeli diplomat Abba Eban that "the Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity."
In Part I, this article will discuss the unworkable deficiencies of both international water law and the 1995 Interim Agreement as applied to the mountain aquifer dispute. Part II will explain how private sector recruitment offers an ideal solution to the Palestinians' political concerns; discuss the challenges associated with private participation in water management; outline how the recent economic growth, relative political stability, and surge of 'Fayyadist' state-building philosophy in the West Bank offer a unique and unprecedented opportunity for privatizing water development; and then apply the lessons of Gaza's water market experiment to West Bank prospects.
This article does not dismiss the normative claims of the Palestinians to the region's water, nor bless Israel's historical water allocation to the West Bank. It merely argues that international water law is inadequate for adjudicating the dispute and that recent demographic and climate trends have rendered the region's available resources unsustainable. Circumstances demand more than politically charged redistribution at the expense of one party. They demand innovative development of new water sources and optimization of existing ones-demands the private sector can help meet. 11 It is important to note that I am not advocating full privatization of the entirety of the Palestinian water supply, but, rather, suggesting a role for the private sector in helping develop alternative water sources.
12 Much of this criticism is founded upon the belief that Israel is illegally occupying Palestinian territory, and interfering with the Palestinians' right to self-determination. The most oft-cited international law on occupation, however-Article 4 of the 4th Geneva Convention and Article 43 of the Hague Regulations-does not address the distinction between "lawful" and "unlawful" occupation, but rather the obligations of the occupying power once military occupation has occurred. For a recent discussion of the notable absence of occupation legality language in international law, The legal debate over "occupation" is, however, outside the scope of this Paper, which is focused on international water law. A discussion of specifically "occupation"-related legal obligations necessarily implicates the larger debate over the nature of the conflict, a realm of virtually unlimited complexity that I do not enter here. But more importantly, the international law of occupation-as codified in provisions like the 4th Geneva Convention and Hague Regulations-does not specifically address water rights.
J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w 14 All international water law that is both customary-that is, generally recognized and practiced by the community of nations-and applicable to Israel is, therefore, relevant and binding.
A. INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW PRE-OSLO
The Palestinians build their case for water rights in the West Bank upon international water law and the 1995 Oslo II Interim Agreement. These documents, however, are ultimately of limited utility as each is either legally inapplicable, non-binding, or diluted of all meaning.
The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that "everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family."
15 In addition to the 1948 J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w Rights, Nov. 11-Nov. 19, 2002 , U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002 /11, General Comment No. 15, art. 11, at 1 (Jan. 20, 2003 . J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 207
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Spring 2013 hydrology, climate, past utilization, economic and social needs, dependent population, avoidance of waste, and the availability of other resources.
19
If the list of relevant factors did not create enough opportunity for disagreement on their own, Article Five ensures that the Rules can be shaped to support virtually any position by any basin state. It provides that "the weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance in comparison with that of the other relevant factors." 20 These balancing addenda virtually eviscerate any possibility for bright-line enforcement, and guarantee that either party in a dispute will shape the Rules' amorphous language in their favor. 21 The Helsinki Rules thus constitute an interpretive nightmare: they beg the outcome-determinative question, and create arguments, rather than resolving disputes.
In an effort to codify the principles outlined in Helsinki as binding international water law, the U.N. drafted the Convention on the Law of NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses in 1997. The Convention drew heavily upon Helsinki's factors in determining equitable utilization; materially deviating only to add an important clause on optimal utilization, whereby riparian states must achieve the optimal use of the watercourse as if no State boundaries existed. 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700 (1997) , available at http:// J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 208 28 See, e.g., Baumgarten, supra note 23, at 196. 29 When Israel first recognized the Palestinian right to water in the Oslo II Agreement (soon to be discussed), the Israeli press warned that "by the explicit recognition of Palestinian water rights Israel has opened . . . a Pandora's Box and created the most dangerous precedent in her history." MARTIN SHERMAN, THE POLITICS OF WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST: AN ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE ON THE HYDRO-POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE CONFLICT 100 (1999). 30 Convention, supra note 22, at art. 2(a).
J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 210 and seasonal rivers" 31 ignores the fundamental hydrology of the West Bank Aquifer. It not only flows into three divergent termini and has "no physical relationship with any surface body of water, and is, in fact, unrelated to any other identifiable water resource."
32 This is not a mere loophole in the Convention, but rather, reflects the difficulties in legally applying equitable utilization principles to confined groundwater resources. Technical knowledge about aquifers is more recent and controversial than that of surface water resources, pollution is a much greater risk with groundwater, and much of the hydrological science is unknown, like flowing patterns, permeability, and soil-water connections. 33 For example, some Israelis insist that the ideal well-sites for accessing the western sub-basins of the Mountain Aquifer are in Israel because the chambers are closer to the surface and can be tapped by shallow wells, thus allowing for fresher extraction 34 -a scientific metric which would leave the Palestinians with no legal right to divert such waters out of Israeli territory without government consent.
35
Even apart from questions surrounding its binding effect and its applicability, the principal deficiency of international water law is that it appears incapable on its face of resolving anything. The relative weight granted to each of the laundry list of "equitable utilization" criteria depends entirely on the interpreter, effectively relocating the dispute to the question of which factor should govern. The Israelis cite the "past and existing utilization" factor to emphasize their extensive development of the region's resources since the beginnings of the Zionist movement; the "economic and social needs" factor because of Israel's far greater economic activity; "the availability of other resources" and "avoidance of waste" factors to point out the sophisticated efficiency with which Mekorot distributes water within 31 Abouli, supra note 24, at 540. 32 Silverbrand, supra note 25, at 623. 33 See Elver, supra note 1, at 439. 34 Id. 35 
Id.
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Spring 2013 Israel compared to woeful Palestinian infrastructure. 36 The Palestinians, for their part, emphasize the "geography," "dependent population," and "substantial injury" factors as advantageous to their position, and retort with understandable exasperation that Israel can only cite their economic efficiency-based criteria because their inequitable water use has nourished socio-economic growth at the Palestinians' expense.
37
One might well argue that Israel should simply elect to embrace these two documents, loopholes and all, as a matter of principled policy because it is the right thing to do, legalistic formalism be damned. Indeed, this article argues later that it is in Israel's interest for the Palestinians to have access to sufficient water resources. Palestinian frustrations with "inapplicability to non-state actors" and "underwater aquifer exception" arguments are understandable. But exasperation over technicalities misses the point: the Convention and Helsinki Rules are not just toothless, inapposite legal instruments that the Palestinians should not rely on for a "water rights" argument, they are also terribly useless from a political perspective. The abstraction with which these two documents seek to plug all the holes of water conflict render them utterly unhelpful from a practical standpoint of dispute resolution. They would credibly resolve nothing. Even Sharif Elmusa, one of the most vocal and articulate advocates of Palestinian water rights, acknowledges that different parameters to be considered in equitable utilization "may be faulted for being too numerous and stated in too general a 36 Id. at 436-41. 37 Id. at 440. See ELMUSA, supra note 23, at 311. For an empirical discussion of how multi-factor legal decision-making precludes consistent, impartial application, see Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581 REV. (2006 . Beebe found that, in applying the multi-factor trademark litigation tests meant to determine the likelihood of consumer confusion, judges from the thirteen circuit courts would discriminately pick and choose which factors to weight heavily, and "stampede" the remaining factors in order to conform to a preferred outcome. Id. at 1581-82.
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Spring 2013 fashion to be useful for negotiations." 38 Mr. Elmusa is far too generous. As an idiosyncratic conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian water debate has always required something a bit more customized.
B. OSLO II
In September 1995, the Israelis and Palestinians signed an agreement governing water rights for the first time. The Oslo II accords included an Annex III, Article 40 addressing the issues of water and sewage management. Compared to the Helsinki Rules, the accords are admirably concrete. The agreement has proved unworkable in the long run, but it was never intended to serve as anything but a temporary provision. The disputes left unresolved by Oslo II have been exacerbated, in part, by the fact that Oslo II undermined its own limited authority with the promise of Final Status Negotiations that have yet to take place.
The Interim Agreement was unprecedented in its statement that "Israel recognizes the Palestinian water rights in the West Bank," but neutered by the following sentence: "These will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations and settled in the Permanent Status Agreement relating to the various water resources." 39 Nevertheless, despite arising under the title "Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement," Oslo II's water article lays out specific metrics for Palestinian future water needs, as well as obligations for both parties.
Oslo II articulated that the West Bank Palestinians required water quantities of 70-80 MCM/yr, which meant that supplies must be increased by 20%, or 23.6 MCM/yr, either by new wells or Israeli allocation. 40 In addition, the Interim Agreement acknowledged the water shortage on both sides, and the imperative of developing additional sources of water-from the Eastern Aquifer sub-basin, as well as recycling from wastewater treatment and 38 Id. at 307. 39 Oslo II, supra note 8, at art. 40, cl. 1. 40 See id. cl. 6. J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 213 desalination. 41 It further prohibited any activities that would lead to pollution of the environment, and compelled proper wastewater treatment responsibilities.
42
In addition, the Interim Agreement established the framework for the formation of a Joint Water Committee (JWC) of both Israelis and Palestinians to implement its terms and "deal with all water and sewage related issues in the West Bank."
43 Since Oslo II, the JWC has continued to meet and function despite the multiple outbreaks of violence, including the brutal Al-Aqsa Intifada of 2000, while "nearly all the other Oslo mechanisms have ground to a halt." 44 Both sides have resorted to charging the other party with rampant violations of Oslo II. This legal crossfire is a result of inappropriately treating Oslo II as a permanent accord rather than the stop-gap truce it was intended to be. The Palestinians claim Israel has refused to meet their water needs, engaged in discriminatory pricing, and used its control over the JWC to repeatedly deny Palestinian requests for licenses to drill wells over the Aquifer.
These accusations have varying degrees of merit. First, Israel has technically met its Oslo II metrics; water supply to the West Bank has increased by 50%, or an additional 60 MCM/yr-22 million supplied by Israel directly and 40 MCM more from ninety new wells approved by the JWC-far more than the 20% increase of 23.6 MCM/yr mandated. 45 But the reality is that West Bank water supply is utterly insufficient, both because the 41 Id. cl. 2-3. 42 Id. cl. 3. 43 Id. cl. 11-12. 44 Silverbrand, supra note 25, at 620. 45 See, e.g., IWA REPORT, supra note 9, at 6-7; Tal, supra note 10, at 62.
J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 214 original PLO-negotiated allocation was and is "abysmally low," 46 and as a result of Palestinian demographic trends. The West Bank population has roughly tripled in the last two decades, with the population currently estimated at 2.46 million, with a growth rate of 2.1 percent per year. 47 The calculus of "future Palestinian water needs" has exploded since Oslo II was drafted, thus exposing the Agreement's limitations as a temporary document forced to carry water beyond its service date.
The Palestinian complaint of discriminatory pricing appears valid on its face, although the Oslo II framework does not speak to pricing comprehensively. Palestinians can effectively pay as much as six times more than Israeli settlers in the West Bank per water unit. 48 Israelis assert that this discrepancy is incidental, due to generally applicable agricultural subsidies to farmers (most Israeli settlers are agricultural) and the inefficient infrastructure of Palestinian Water Authority transport. 49 Although the PWA purchases water from Mekorot at a price equal to Israelis (before agricultural subsidies), Palestinian municipalities will often charge an elevated price for distribution. 50 There is reason to believe that annual water price increases in cities like Ramallah are due almost entirely to wasteful Palestinian administration policies. 51 Israelis also point out that the JWC's price-setting collaboration with Mekorot is legitimated by the fact that the JWC is a creature of Oslo II. J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 215
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Still, Palestinians argue that the JWC is, in reality, not a jointly managed committee, but an Israeli-dominated entity that has merely formalized discriminatory practices, and consistently refuses to grant licenses for Palestinian aquifer infrastructure construction.
53 Close scrutiny of the Committee's minutes reveals a more complicated reality: the JWC Hydrological Committee has approved the drilling of seventy new water wells and twenty-two observation wells for the West Bank Palestinians in the eastern sub-basin (of which only half have been implemented), the Water Works committee has approved more than twenty reservoirs and pumping stations, and the Sewage Committee has approved numerous wastewater treatment plants in all major Palestinian cities, to be funded by donor countries, only one of which has been constructed in Nevertheless, the water needs of Palestinians are not being met, and they have some legitimate legal grievances. Israel has not adequately policed Mekorot pricing, and the Joint Water Committee might well be capable of granting more Palestinian well licenses. However, these claims can be attributed, in part, to Olso II's deficiencies. The Interim Agreement is nowhere close to sufficiently exhaustive when it comes to pricing, joint management, and public policy issues (like government subsidies)-and for good reason: the Interim Period was originally determined to extend no more than five years from its signing. the Palestinians are extracting about 10 MCM/yr. 56 The Agreement, however, states in § 7(b)(6) that the additional 28.6 MCM/yr earmarked for "future Palestinian needs" "shall be developed by the Palestinians from the Eastern Aquifer and other agreed sources in the West Bank," 57 yet the JWC has failed to approve these illegal wells.
Additionally, West Bank Palestinians have adopted the recent practice of attaching unauthorized "pirate" connections to Mekorot water supply pipelines.
58 Israel has reported water shortages in Hebron, Kiryat Arba, Bani Naim, and other outposts, allegedly caused by water theft by inhabitants of the Sair and Shuyukh villages for irrigating fields along the fringes of the Judean desert. 59 The aqua-piracy, estimated at about 3.5 MCM/yr, has forced Israel to lay new pipelines across the West Bank.
60
These difficulties all ultimately reflect the extent to which Oslo II has out-lived its welcome. As the West Bank population has out-raced Oslo's obsolete water metrics, Israel's technically legal compliance has translated to dwindling Palestinian per-capita consumption.
61
This has led to understandable acts of desperation. Crowing about successfully approved JWC wells (with numerous license requests pending) 62 and satisfied 56 Id. at 9-10. 57 Oslo II, supra note 8, § 7(b)(6).
58 IWA REPORT, supra note 9, at 11. J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 217 63 When asked to point fingers across the diplomatic divide at specific violations-and these parties rarely await a request-Israel focuses on Palestinian failures at water infrastructure development. Sections Two and Three of the Interim Agreement state the responsibility of both parties to make efforts to develop alternative water supply sources (like wastewater recycling and desalination) and to maximize conservation by reducing inefficient distribution. In an interview, Lieutenant Colonel Sharon Davidovich, the Israeli National Director of the Jewish National Parsons Water Fund, articulated his side's exasperation: "Use foreign donations to build a wastewater treatment or desalination plant," he insists, "and I guarantee you, you will never hear another Israeli mention the word piracy again."
64
Israel perceives the Palestinian Authority as willfully refusing to cooperate on these issues, and thus, failing to meet their § § 2-3 obligations. Palestinian experts themselves acknowledge, for example, that about thirty percent of the scarce water allocated to West Bank cities leaks out of poorly maintained pipes, despite the availability of technologies that could quickly identify and plug such leaks. Nor have the Palestinians endeavored to develop new, alternative water sources. Israel has responded to the water crisis by utilizing desalination plants, wastewater treatment, and stormwater impoundment to increase its overall water supply by about 2,000 MCM/yr. 66 Unlike desalinated water, recycled wastewater is not usually drinkable; however, wastewater facilities can produce irrigation-quality water, thus liberating potable freshwater supplies that otherwise would have been siphoned off to agricultural uses. Israel has cut the amount of fresh water earmarked for agriculture by half in the last decade by increasing the percentage of municipal sewage that is treated and used for irrigation by 72%. Sewage treatment therefore presents an opportunity to not only protect scarce environmental resources (like groundwater) from contamination, but to increase those resources as well. 68 This has converted the Kishon, Alexander-Nablus, Modiin, Kidron, and Hebron streams into foul sewage tracts, and http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/04/us-water-israel-leaksidUSTRE5A303X20091104 (describing the readily available technology with which countries can retro-fit and modernize their water pipes in order to minimize wasteful leakage). 66 IWA REPORT, supra note 9, at 15. 67 Id. at 13. Plans for a new $6.2 million wastewater facility in Jenin to be jointly managed by the Palestinian Water Authority, Japanese government, and U.N. Development program were announced three years ago, but construction has appeared to stall. 68 IWA REPORT, supra note 9, at 12.
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Spring 2013 contaminated wells in Bethlehem, the Jordan Valley, and Jerusalem, leading to their closure, and thereby exacerbating supply shortages.
69
Lack of Palestinian economic resources cannot account for the conspicuous absence of wastewater and desalination plant projects (or, for that matter, stalled pipe modernization), as some argue. 70 A host of donor countries (including Germany, the USA, and Japan as well as the World Bank) have expressed their willingness to allocate considerable funds of over $300 million per year for facility construction, but the Palestinians have not advanced the projects.
71 From 2002 From -2007 , of the $130 million of foreign aid earmarked for sewerage systems, only $25 million has been invested in the El-Bireh plant; the Palestinian Authority has declined foreign funding for desalination and sewage treatment facilities in Nablus, Tulkarm, Jenin, Salfit, Ramallah, Kidron, Hebron, and other villages. 72 This extends to urban delivery system neglect: Alon Tal observes, Regardless of one's view, even the most avid Palestinian advocates would have a hard time making the case that a fair share of the prodigious humanitarian assistance has been allotted to Palestinian water infrastructure. Despite the generosity of the international community, investment in improving municipal water delivery has been insignificant. 73 So, why on earth is the Palestinian Authority refusing to allocate foreign aid to Oslo II water supply goals? The answer, once again, originates with 69 Id. 70 See, e.g., ELMUSA, supra note 23, at 321 (arguing that economic imbalances between Palestinians and Israelis account for the discrepancy in alternative water resource development projects). 71 IWA REPORT, supra note 9, at 14.
72 Id.; see also Palestine, supra note 67 (reporting on the Palestinian Authority's refusal to accept foreign funding). 73 Tal, supra note 10, at 7.
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Oslo II's flaws as an ad hoc document of fleeting usefulness. By dangling the notion of final status negotiations in the near future, Oslo II de-legitimized its own authority, and created an incentive for prospective bargaining tactics. The Palestinian Authority views any acceptance of foreign aid for water recycling purposes as potentially fraught with invisible strings attachednamely, that acceptance could be interpreted as a forfeiture of the Palestinians' sovereign claim to the entire mountain aquifer. 74 Final negotiations would surely be sponsored by the U.S. and chaperoned by the international community, and Palestinians are wary of weakening their position at the proverbial future table-both regarding claims to the freshwater sources they believe are theirs and to innumerable other associated issues.
The specter of Final Status Talks increasingly resembles a fading mirage in the desert-it wavers on the horizon, and each party sees in it what it wishes to see. For the Palestinians, that means refugees, the "right of return," final status of Jerusalem, and water sovereignty. "The Palestinians will not take funds gift-wrapped for alternative water resource development," Lt. Col. Davidovich said, "they view it as a white flag in the aquifer conflict, and perhaps not entirely unreasonably." few kilometers away and which produce one thousand liters of crystal-clear water for fifty cents. 77 "Rights," in other words, are holding "needs" hostage.
Both parties' alleged Oslo II breaches are symptomatic of the Interim Agreement's limitations. This is not to say that the Israelis and Palestinians are blameless. Each has probably breached Oslo: the Israelis have been too lenient with Mekorot's discriminatory pricing, whatever they say on the subject of agricultural subsidies for Jewish settlers, and the Palestinians have failed to develop their infrastructure or consistently follow JWC channels before drilling illegal wells and pirate connections.
But Oslo II itself remains the real culprit. It could not account for changing demographic, hydrological, and climate trends fifteen years later; it left numerous issues purposefully unsettled; and most problematic, it declared a nebulous date with a destiny that left both parties scrambling to tactically outmaneuver one another and gain future leverage. It thus offers slightly more help than the rest of the international water law in providing practical solutions.
The West Bank Palestinians are therefore suspended in a physical and diplomatic drought with a deficit of legal authority upon which to state a claim.
In biblical times, this is where God would come in.
II. PRIVATIZATION AND THE NEW "STAFF OF MOSES"
In the Bible's Exodus passages, the weary Israelites demand water of Moses. But their prophet has no water in his possession to give, and the miracle comes from an untapped source.
In the Middle East, history often (tragically) repeats itself. The Israelis do not have sufficient water to satisfy the Palestinians' growing demand. If annual precipitation continues to drop, Israel will soon be approaching 77 See Tal, supra note 10, at 11. J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 222 minimal WHO standard levels of potable drinking water; 78 it cannot realistically (or politically) be expected to further deprive its citizens of fresh water sources before Final Status Talks offer them something in return. Even if Israel was willing to do the unthinkable, it would still not be enough; a recent study by the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute projected that, if current demographic, economic, and environmental trends continue in the region and no new water resources are developed, total regional demand for water would be three times the supply by 2020. 79 The bottom line is this: if Palestinians do not begin investing in retro-fitting urban water delivery, desalination plants, and modern sewage infrastructure, all the new allocation schemes and legal indictments in the world will not save them from thirst.
The Palestinians dream of an equitable two-state solution that safeguards their water rights in the West Bank; and who can possibly blame them? Yet, in hearing only the tempting siren call of Final Status Talks, they sacrifice available remedies in the present. So, how can they be convinced to plug their own ears with Odyssean wax and sail past such concerns? The challenge is to craft a solution to ameliorate the water supply problem while persuading the Palestinians that developing alternative water sources will not divest them of their future "water rights." The solution may lie in an alternative vehicle to a state-run development project: privatization.
Private sector investment is not accompanied by the same "strings attached" paranoia as foreign aid. Even if the Palestinians protest abandoning Oslo II's "rights" language, privatization would actually strengthen the Palestinians' argument, stripping Israel of its § § 2-3 "infrastructure clause" allegation: The Palestinian Authority would be utilizing private sector expertise to minimize inefficiency, develop new supply sources, and manage their waste-all without the charity of foreign governments. Moreover, expanded privatization would reduce Palestinian dependency on Mekorot supply and prices, diffusing tensions in the peace process. 78 See, e.g., Elver, supra note 1, at 427. J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 223
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There is the possibility, of course, that the Palestinians will view alternative water source development of any kind as a waiver of aquifer sovereignty, regardless of whether the funding comes from private investment or foreign aid. This seems unlikely, given the incontrovertibly independent self-sufficiency of private sector investment compared to foreign donations. Nevertheless, a voluntary stipulation by Israel that any Palestinian partnerships with private firms to construct development facilities will not affect future rights claims could certainly alleviate any remaining Palestinian reservations. The Palestinians willingly signed Oslo II, in part, because of a similar stipulation in Article 40's clause 8: "The provisions of paragraphs 6-7 above shall not prejudice the provisions of paragraph 1 to this Article"-in other words, that the established metrics of Palestinian water needs would not dilute the previous recognition of their sovereign rights claims. 80 It is in the interests of both parties to ameliorate the region's water shortages, and Israel would likely be more than willing to incentivize Palestinian water development.
81
The West Bank's Palestinians can do more than pray to the heavens for salvation. They do not require a divine staff to spring water from rock as the Israelites did; their key to unlocking life from the seemingly barren surrounding terrain may well be the private sector.
Part II will first summarize the general critique of privatizing an essential humanitarian good, like water, and the difficulties recent water privatization projects have encountered, then argue that the current opportunities in the West Bank outweigh those concerns. It will then explain how the Fayyadist state-building in the West Bank has recently established a regulatory and economic environment that is amenable to private investment, briefly note the legal hurdles to increased privatization in the water sector, and then apply the lessons offered by a case study of the private water market in Gaza. 80 Oslo II, supra note 8, cl. 8. 81 See Davidovich Interview, supra note 63.
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A. THE CHALLENGE
Critics of water privatization argue that water is a public good and a basic human right that cannot be surrendered to private control. 82 The concern is that private companies have the welfare of their investors at heart, not the health of the general population; they will exclusively pursue profits, raise prices to unaffordable levels, disregard notions of equity, and reduce access to quality water. If these corporations encounter difficulties or if returns are insufficient, they may well abandon their project. Thus, because sovereign governments are bound by an imperative duty to provide access to water for its citizens, deferring to private companies to commoditize a natural resource constitutes a per se violation of human rights. So goes the reasonable critique.
There is no reason, however, that states cannot fulfill their obligations to the general population with proper regulation and oversight of any private role in water infrastructure. As noted previously, the ICESR is one of the documents cited by water rights advocates as outlining a basic human right to water. General Comment 15, however, states the following:
Where water services . . . are operated or controlled by third parties, States parties must prevent them from compromising equal, affordable, and physical access to sufficient, safe and acceptable water. To prevent such abuses an effective regulatory system must be established, in conformity with the Covenant and this General Comment, which includes independent J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 225
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83
The human rights regime itself, therefore, contemplates the notion of nonstate third parties controlling a state's water supply. Private sector involvement in water distribution raises a number of critical challenges, but it is difficult to insist that privatization itself is, by definition, a violation of water rights.
The recent record of water projects in the developing world is admittedly mixed. The Phillipines' 1997 privatization of Manila's Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, for example, led to skyrocketing prices and a complete failure to provide affordable, clean drinking water and sewer services. 84 The plan's goal was to expand access to all of the city's 11 million residents and streamline municipal efficiency, but it failed to deliver meaningful improvements.
85
The privatization disaster in Cochabamba, Bolivia is often cited as the prototypical cautionary tale.
86 A municipal company, SEMAPA, had controlled the water system in Cochabamba before privatization, but only provided it to 57% of the population, and the system's inefficiencies lost half the water supply in transport leaks. 87 Water was rationed and those without 83 ECOSOC, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: General Comment No. 15 (2002 ), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002 /11 (Jan. 20, 2003 'L L. 469, 496-98 (2007) .
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Spring 2013 access purchased water from private wells and vendors. 88 In 1998, the World Bank pressured Bolivia to privatize the system as a condition of a massive foreign aid loan. 89 The project was awarded to Aguas del Tarini, a transnational subsidiary of American company Bechtel. The concession agreement mandated an expansion of services but failed to regulate price hikes with any specificity beyond the vague command of the system being "accessible, fair, and efficient" when dealing with users. 90 Aguas del Tarini raised rates by 35%, and some citizens reported increases in water prices as high as 200%.
91 When workers began receiving monthly bills amounting to half their total income, the population began to revolt. 92 The passionate and, at times, violent protests that followed have been termed the "Water War." Eventually, the Bolivian government was forced to cancel the concession.
The developing world landscape is littered with failed water privatization projects, but it is no graveyard. There have also been some notable triumphs.
93 A less than stellar success rate should not dissuade the West Bank Palestinians from considering the merits of partial privatization. J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 227 Second, past privatization disasters have turned largely on insufficient government regulation, 95 a shortcoming that the increasingly robust Palestinian Authority government can avoid with proper supervision through regulatory frameworks. I will argue in the following sections that the current economic and political environment in the West Bank presents an unprecedented opportunity for successful private sector investment in water development, and that recent water experiments in Gaza and Israel's Middle Eastern neighbors may prove instructive for the West Bank.
Perhaps most importantly, the Palestinians are already dependent on the prices of an Israeli water company, Mekorot, and the region's total water supply is unsustainable. Pursuant to the state regulatory obligations outlined in the ICESR's General Comment 15, private sector recruitment is the best option for increasing Palestinian control over their water destiny.
B. THE MOMENT
"I have to admit, we, the private sector, have changed. The mood used to be all the time to complain and say there is nothing we can do. And then the politicians were trying to create this atmosphere of resistance-no development under occupation. Now, Fayyad and his boss, President Mahmoud Abbas, changed that. Now the mood, said Hulileh, is that improving the Palestinian economy "is what will enable you to resist and be J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 228 The traditional reasons private sector investment in the Palestinian territories has been viewed as unattractive are risk and economic underdevelopment. Instability, governmental non-transparency, and a lack of access to capital do not make for a happy investor. As long as Israeli security unpredictably restricted movement, capital flow was dubious, and institutional corruption remained systemic, an increased private sector role in water infrastructure development in the West Bank seemed out of the question. In 1997, Sharif Elmusa captured the conventional wisdom, writing that private contracting to build water recycling facilities was "precluded for the foreseeable future." 97 ELMUSA, supra note 23, at 323. See also Elver, supra note 1, at 427 (stating that West Bank Palestinians "lacks the financial means for new investment and the necessary institutions to impose good management to ensure that the best use is made of limited water resources").
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The strategic shift has begun to pay dividends. With annual outbreaks of violence continuing to decrease since the last Intifada, senior Israeli military officials have acknowledged that Fayyad's trained security forces are "the real deal." 98 The approval is not merely symbolic; Israel has relaxed its checkpoint restrictions and road-blocks within the West Bank, which has led to an increased flow of investment and commerce. 99 The Palestinian economy grew by a resounding 9% last year, the Al-Quds Index (Palestinian Securities Exchange) increased by 18%, and wages are skyrocketing.
100
In its September 2010 report, the IMF attributed the West Bank's newly flourishing economy to a number of factors beyond improved security. It praised aggressive financial sector reforms implemented by the P.A., which brought territory banks into line with international lending standards and established a modern credit-scoring system to facilitate borrowing. 101 On the fiscal side, The Palestinian Authority cut public payrolls and subsidy spending, allowing it to decrease dependence on foreign aid-from Europe, J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 236
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This article, however, has argued that the water scarcity in the West Bank is the very reason why private sector involvement may be the best option for the future. International water law, including Oslo II, has proved inadequate at addressing the needs of the West Bank Palestinians. Even if the P.A. were able to extract massive, unrealistic allocations from Israel's water supply, alternative resource development would still be imperative, given demographic and environmental trends.
As long as Final Status Negotiations linger on the horizon, the Palestinians are intent on focusing the water debate on sovereign rights, rather than humanitarian needs. They view foreign donations offering funding for development facilities as Trojan Horses stuffed with rights waivers. This Catch-22 leaves the P.A. stranded, without help from the law, and without help from abroad.
But the Palestinians can help themselves. Private sector recruitment offers a way to sidestep foreign aid's attached strings (real or imagined) and reduce tensions with Israel over allocation. Not only could (partial) privatization increase the West Bank's water supply by treating wastewater for agricultural use and desalinated water for domestic use, it would also undercut Israel's Oslo argument that the Palestinians are violating their obligations to optimize water system efficiencies and treat sewage.
The anxiety that privatizing water management would sacrifice control over a critical public good and create a national security risk has it backwards: Contracting with private investors to build alternative water sources would buttress Palestinians' control over their destiny, not destabilize it. Today, the West Bank Palestinians are wholly dependent on Israeli Mekorot prices and wasteful municipal administration, and drought forecasts and population growth have them on a calamitous humanitarian crash course. As is, it would be difficult for Palestinians to have less control over their water supply than they currently enjoy.
Moreover, the current political and economic environment is as ripe as ever for private investment in the West Bank. Fayyadism has re-calibrated notions of Palestinian state-building. Increased security, governmental reform, and economic growth have combined to produce a unique moment in recent Palestinian history. The P.A. should learn from the successes and J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 237
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Spring 2013 failures of Gaza's experiment with private water management, and pursue an effective mix of regulation, investment incentives, and possible subsidy support to meet Palestinian needs.
Finally, privatizing water development in the West Bank can have a salutary effect on the peace process. Legal feuding over Oslo II has exacerbated tensions between Israel and the Palestinian Authority and added another conflict to the long list of disagreements contributing to the diplomatic dead-lock. Removing the water issue from the negotiations arena and reducing Palestinian dependence on Israeli water allocation could help diffuse the atmosphere. There is no guarantee that such efforts will help lay the road to Final Status Negotiations-there are myriad of other boulders obstructing that path, but it certainly cannot hurt.
Some things in the Middle East never change; a permanent water scarcity may well be one of them. Still, while Moses and the Israelites needed God in order to strike water from rock, the West Bank Palestinians of the 21st century do not.
